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Abstract
It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent
with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many
election systems, but for all studied systems the winner problem is in P, and so control is in NP.
There are election systems, such as Kemeny, that have many desirable properties, but whose
winner problems are not in NP. Thus for such systems control is not in NP, and in fact we show
that it is typically complete for Σp2 (i.e., NP
NP, the second level of the polynomial hierarchy).
This is a very high level of complexity. Approaches that perform quite well for solving NP
problems do not necessarily work for Σp2-complete problems. However, answer set programming
is suited to express problems in Σp2, and we present an encoding for Kemeny control.
Introduction
The study of elections often deals with trade-offs for different properties that an election system
satisfies. Elections have a wide range of applications from voting in political elections to applications
in artificial intelligence (see, e.g., Brandt et al. [11]). And given the role of elections in multiagent
system settings, it is important that we study the computational properties of election systems.
Attacks on the structure of an election, referred to as control, were introduced by Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [4] and model natural scenarios where an agent, with control over the structure
of an election, modifies the structure (e.g., by adding candidates) to ensure that their preferred
candidate wins. It is important to study how these types of attacks on the structure of an election
can affect the outcome and how computationally difficult it is to determine if such an attack exists.
The complexity of electoral control has been studied for many different natural elections systems
and has been an important line of research in computational social choice (see, e.g., Faliszewski and
Rothe [21]). However, for all of those systems the winner problems are in P, and so the standard
control problems are in NP. To go beyond what can easily be encoded for SAT solvers, we need to
look at election systems with harder winner problems. But even for election systems whose winner
problems are in NP, the most common control problems are still in NP.
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There are election systems that have many desirable social-choice properties, but whose winner
problems are not in NP (assuming NP 6= coNP). One important example is the Kemeny rule [33],
whose winner problem is Θp2-complete (i.e., complete for parallel access to NP) [31] and so the
complexity of the standard control problems for Kemeny are all Θp2-hard and thus also not in NP.
For election systems with Θp2-complete winner problems, control is in Σ
p
2 (i.e., NP
NP, the second level
of the polynomial hierarchy), and we show that control is typically Σp2-complete for such systems.
This is a very high level of complexity. And so a natural question to ask is how Kemeny control
can be solved. We mention here that there has been a long line of work that considers ways to solve
hard election problems. This includes work on computing Kemeny winners (see, e.g., [14, 6, 2, 5])
and on solving election-attack problems (see, e.g., Rothe and Schend [40]). The work on solving hard
election-attack problems has been restricted to problems in NP, and such approaches do not work
for Σp2-complete problems. Answer set programming (ASP) is an approach that has been recently
applied for winner determination in voting, including for systems with hard winner problems [13].
ASP is suited to express Σp2 problems. However, encoding Σ
p
2-complete problems in ASP requires
the use of more advanced techniques than encoding computationally easier problems. We present an
encoding of Kemeny control using these advanced techniques and discuss other related approaches.
We make the following main contributions.
• We obtain the first natural Σp2-completeness results for elections.
• We define several new natural and simple Σp2-complete graph problems to prove our results,
and these problems compare favorably in naturalness and simplicity to other Σp2-complete
problems, and so in usefulness as problems to reduce from.
• We show for the most commonly-studied election systems with Θp2-complete winner problems,
including the Kemeny rule, that control is typically Σp2-complete.
• We build upon recent work on combining ASP with voting [13] by encoding our Σp2-complete
control problems using advanced ASP techniques.
Preliminaries
An election consists of a set of candidates C, and a set of voters V , where each voter has a vote that
strictly ranks each candidate from most to least preferred. An election system, E , maps an election
(C, V ) to a set of winners, where the winner set can be any subset of the candidate set. The winner
problem for an election system, E-Winner, is defined in the following way. Given an election (C, V )
and a candidate p ∈ C, is p a winner of the election using election system E?
We consider the most important election systems with Θp2-complete winner problems: Kemeny,
Young, and Dodgson.
A candidate is a Kemeny winner if it is the most-preferred candidate in a Kemeny consensus [33],
which is a total order “>” that minimizes the sum of Kendall’s Tau distances (i.e., number of pairwise
disagreements) with the voters in an election, i.e., minimizes
∑
a,b∈C,a>b ‖{v ∈ V | b >v a}‖, where
>v denotes the preference of voter v.
A candidate is a Young winner if it can become a weak Condorcet winner (a candidate that
beats-or-ties every other candidate pairwise) by deleting the fewest voters [48].
A candidate is a Dodgson winner if it can become a Condorcet winner (a candidate that beats
every other candidate pairwise) with the fewest swaps between adjacent candidates in the voters’
rankings [16].
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Electoral control models the actions of an agent, referred to as the election chair, who modifies
the structure of the election (e.g., the voters) to ensure that their preferred candidate wins (in the
constructive case) [4] or that their despised candidate does not win (in the destructive case) [30].1
(These two papers define the standard control actions.) We formally define constructive control by
adding candidates (CCAC) below, which models the real-world scenario of an election chair adding
spoiler candidates to an election to ensure that their preferred candidate wins.
Name: E-CCAC
Given: A set of registered candidates C, a set of unregistered candidates D, a set of voters V having
preferences over C ∪D, an addition limit k, and a preferred candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Does there exist a set D′ ⊆ D such that ‖D′‖ ≤ k and p is a winner of (C ∪D′, V ) using
election system E?
Computational Complexity Our results concern the complexity classes Θp2 and Σ
p
2. The class
Θp2 was introduced in [39], named in [46], and shown to be equivalent to P
NP
|| , the class of problems
that can be solved by a polynomial-time machine with parallel access to an NP oracle, in [28].
Σp2 = NP
NP is the class of problems solvable by a nondeterministic polynomial-time machine with
access to an NP oracle, and is the second level of the polynomial hierarchy [38, 45]. Note that
NP ∪ coNP ⊆ Θp2 ⊆ P
NP ⊆ Σp2.
Complexity Results
In this section we show that control problems for Kemeny, Young, and Dodgson elections are typically
Σp2-complete.
Observation 1 For an election system E, the complexity of each standard control action is in
NPE-Winner.
It is easy to see that the above observation holds. For a given election, guess the control action of
the chair (e.g., the set of candidates to be added) and then use the oracle to check that the preferred
candidate is a winner (or that the despised candidate is not a winner). In the case of partition
control, which will not be discussed further in this paper, the oracle will also be used to determine
which candidates participate in the runoff.
The winner problems for Kemeny, Young, and Dodgson are each in Θp2, and so the complexity
of each standard control action is in NPΘ
p
2 = Σp2.
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Corollary 2 For Kemeny, Young, and Dodgson elections, the complexity of each standard control
action is in Σp2.
As mentioned in Brandt et al. [10], these control problems inherit Θp2-hardness from their winner
problems.
We will now show that these control problems are typically Σp2-complete. Our Σ
p
2-completeness
results are summarized in Table 1 and we conjecture that for Kemeny, Young, and Dodgson elections,
the complexity of each standard control action is Σp2-complete.
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1We mention here that early work that considered electoral control generally used the unique winner model whereas
we allow multiple winners. This rarely makes a difference in the complexity for concrete systems.
2Note that Σp
2
= NPNP ⊆ NPΘ
p
2 ⊆ NPP
NP
= NPNP = Σp
2
.
3De Haan [15] shows Σp
2
-hardness for control by adding/deleting issues for an analogue of Kemeny for judgment
aggregation. Since our setting is much more restrictive, this lower bound does not at all imply our lower bound.
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Table 1: Summary of our Σp2-completeness results for control. Kemeny
′ refers to a natural variant of Kemeny
defined in [17] and (∗) refers to the variant of control where the chair can delete only certain candidates.
Adding Deleting
Voters Young (Thm 10)
Young (Thm 9)
Kemeny′ (Thm 7)
Candidates Kemeny (Thm 6) Kemeny (∗) (Thm 5)
Dodgson (Thm 11) Dodgson (Thm 11)
We mention here that there are far fewer completeness results for Σp2 than there are for NP
(see Schaefer and Umans [43, 44] for a list of completeness results in the polynomial hierarchy).
An important reason why proving Σp2-hardness is difficult is the scarcity of “simple” Σ
p
2-complete
problems to reduce from. For example, scoring versions of Kemeny, Young, and Dodgson are proven
NP-hard by reductions from simple NP-complete problems such as Vertex-Cover, but prior to this
paper there were no Σp2-complete simple versions of Vertex-Cover that were suitable to show that
related control-by-adding problems are Σp2-hard.
Below we define simple and natural Σp2-complete versions of Vertex-Cover (and the analogous
Independent-Set versions are also Σp2-complete). We will see that these problems are particularly
useful to show that our control problems are Σp2-hard. Of course, we need to show that our new
simple problems are Σp2-hard, which is difficult. But we can then reuse our simple problems to
obtain simpler Σp2-hard proofs for multiple other problems.
The following problem (and its closely related Independent-Set analogue) is particularly useful
to reduce to control-by-adding problems. For example, we will see that this problem quite easily
reduces to Kemeny-CCAC and that the Independent-Set analogue of this problem reduces quite
easily to Young-CCAV (control by adding voters).
Name: Vertex-Cover-Member-Add
Given: Graph G = (V ∪ V ′, E), set of addable vertices V ′, addition limit k, and vertex vˆ ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist a set W ⊆ V ′ of at most k addable vertices such that vˆ is a member of
a minimum vertex cover4 of (V ∪W,E)?
Theorem 3 Vertex-Cover-Member-Add is Σp2-complete.
To show the essence of the argument of the proof of Theorem 3 and avoid some of the more
finicky details of the proof, we prove that Vertex-Cover-Member-Select is Σp2-complete, and then
briefly discuss how this proof can be adapted for Vertex-Cover-Member-Add.5
Name: Vertex-Cover-Member-Select
Given: Graph G = (V,E), a set V ′ ⊆ V of deletable vertices, delete limit k, and vertex vˆ ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist a set W ⊆ V ′ of at most k deletable vertices such that vˆ is a member
of a minimum vertex cover of G−W?6
4A vertex cover of a graph is a set of vertices such that every edge is incident with at least one vertex in the set.
5We can easily prove Vertex-Cover-Member-Select Σp
2
-hard by reducing the Σp
2
-complete problem Generalized-
Node-Deletion to it, in which we are given a graph, and two integers k and ℓ, and we ask if we can delete at most k
vertices such that the remaining graph does not contain Kℓ+1, a clique of size ℓ + 1 [42]. For the reduction, simply
output (H, V (H), k, vˆ), where H is the graph (G ∪ ({vˆ}, ∅))×Kℓ+1.
However, this proof does not generalize to Vertex-Cover-Member-Add. In particular, the “adding” analogue of
Generalized-Node-Deletion in which we ask if we can add up to k vertices such that the resulting graph does not have
a clique of size ℓ+ 1, is in P (since it is best to add nothing). And the version where we ask if there is a clique of size
ℓ+ 1 after adding is in NP.
6G−W = (V (G) −W, {{v, w} | {v, w} ∈ E(G) ∧ v, w ∈ V (G)−W}).
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Lemma 4 Vertex-Cover-Member-Select is Σp2-complete.
Proof. Membership in Σp2 is easy to see: Guess at most k deletable vertices to delete, then guess a
vertex cover containing vˆ and use the NP oracle to check that the guessed vertex cover is a minimum
vertex cover.
To show hardness, we reduce from the following Σp2-complete problem, QSAT2 [45, 47]: all true
formulas of the form ∃x1 · · · ∃xn¬(∃y1 · · · ∃ynφ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn)), where φ is a formula in 3cnf.7
We first recall the standard reduction from 3SAT to Vertex-Cover [32]. Let G be the graph
constructed by this reduction on φ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn), where φ is in 3cnf. Let φ = ψ1∧ψ2∧· · ·∧ψm
and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ψi = ci,1 ∨ ci,2 ∨ ci,3. Graph G consists of 4n+ 3m vertices: a vertex for
each xi, xi, yi, and yi and for each clause i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, three vertices ci,1, ci,2, and ci,3, and the
following edges:
• for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the edges {xi, xi} and {yi, yi},
• for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the edges {ci,1, ci,2}, {ci,1, ci,3}, and {ci,2, ci,3}, (i.e., the complete graph
on three vertices),
• and for each vertex ci,j we have an edge to its corresponding vertex candidate (e.g., if ci,j = xt
in φ then we have the edge {ci,j , xt}).
An example of this construction will follow.
Note that every vertex cover of G contains at least one of each {xi, xi}, at least one of each
{yi, yi}, and at least two of each {ci,1, ci,2, ci,3}, so G does not have a vertex cover of size less than
2n+ 2m. The properties below follow immediately from the proof from [32].
1. If X is a vertex cover of size 2n + 2m, then X ∩ {xi, xi, yi, yi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to a
satisfying assignment for φ.
2. If α is a satisfying assignment for φ, then there is a vertex cover X of size 2n+ 2m such that
X ∩ {xi, xi, yi, yi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to this assignment.
Below we include an example of this construction given the formula φ = (x1 ∨ x1 ∨ y1) ∧ (x1 ∨
y1 ∨ y1) ∧ (x1 ∨ y1 ∨ y1).
x1 y1 y1
c1,2
c1,1 c1,3
c2,2
c2,1 c2,3
c3,2
c3,3c3,1
x1
In the figure above vertices that are in a minimum vertex cover are shaded in gray, and this
corresponds to the satisfying assignment x1 = 0, y1 = 1 for φ.
For the reduction from QSAT2 to Vertex-Cover-Member-Select, we construct the graphH , which
is a modified version of the graph G. For each clause i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, instead of the complete graph
on three vertices, {ci,1, ci,2, ci,3}, we add an extra vertex di and have the complete graph on four
vertices, {ci,1, ci,2, ci,3, di}, and we connect the fourth vertex di of each clause gadget to a special
new vertex vˆ. So our graph H consists of 4n+4m+1 vertices and the edges as just described. Below
we give the graph corresponding to the same formula as the previous example.
7Note that we have the same number of variables in each quantified block (we can simply pad to get this). Also,
we pull the negation out of the formula so that the formula is in 3cnf and not in 3dnf.
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Note that every vertex cover of H contains at least one of each {xi, xi}, at least one of each
{yi, yi}, and at least three of each {ci,1, ci,2, ci,3, di}. So H does not have a vertex cover of size less
than 2n+ 3m, and there is a vertex cover of size 2n+ 3m+ 1 that includes vˆ. Note that H has the
following properties.
1. If X is a vertex cover of size 2n+3m, then vˆ 6∈ X and X∩{xi, xi, yi, yi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds
to a satisfying assignment for φ.
2. If α is a satisfying assignment for φ, then there is a vertex cover of size 2n + 3m such that
X ∩ {xi, xi, yi, yi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to this assignment.
Below we include an example of this construction given the formula ∃x1¬(∃y1φ(x1, y1)), where
as before
φ = (x1 ∨ x1 ∨ y1) ∧ (x1 ∨ y1 ∨ y1) ∧ (x1 ∨ y1 ∨ y1).
x1 y1 y1
c1,2
c1,1
d1
c1,3
c2,2
c2,1
d2
c2,3
c3,2
c3,3
d3
c3,1
vˆ
x1
Note that in the figure when x1 is removed (i.e., setting x1 = 0) a minimum-size vertex cover
(shaded in gray) is of size n+ 3m = 10 and that φ(0, y1) is satisfied with y1 = 1.
We have repeated the same graph below, except now the vertex x1 is removed (i.e., setting
x1 = 1).
x1 y1 y1
c1,2
c1,1
d1
c1,3
c2,2
c2,1
d2
c2,3
c3,2
c3,3
d3
c3,1
vˆ
x1
The vertices shaded in gray above correspond to a minimum-size vertex cover of size n+3m+1 =
11. Note that φ(1, y1) is not satisfiable and that this vertex cover includes vˆ.
We will show that ∃x1 · · · ∃xn¬(∃y1 · · · ∃ynφ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn)) if and only if we can delete
at most n vertices in {xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} such that vˆ is a member of a minimum vertex cover of
H-after-deletion.
From the listed properties ofH and the above example, it is not too hard to see that the statement
above holds as long as the vertices deleted from H correspond to an assignment to the x-variables.
However, it is possible for the set of deleted vertices to contain neither or both of {xi, xi}. We handle
these cases below.
Suppose that W is a set of at most n vertices from {xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} such that vˆ is a member
of a minimum vertex cover of H −W . Let n̂ ≤ n be the number of {xi, xi} pairs that are undeleted,
i.e., for which {xi, xi}∩W = ∅. Note that the size of a vertex cover of H −W is at least n̂+n+3m,
6
and that vertex covers of that size do not include vˆ. Since vˆ is a member of a minimum size vertex
cover of H −W , it follows that H −W does not have a vertex cover of size n̂+ n+ 3m.
Let α ∈ {0, 1}n be an assignment to x1 · · ·xn that is consistent with W , in the sense that for all
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if W ∩{xi, xi} = {xi}, then αi = 1 and if W ∩{xi, xi} = {xi}, then αi = 0. To complete
the proof, suppose for a contradiction that φ(α1, . . . , αn, y1, . . . , yn) is satisfiable. Then H has a
vertex cover X of size 2n+3m such that X∩{xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to α. Note that X−W
is a vertex cover of H−W . But ‖X∩W‖ = n− n̂, and so ‖X−W‖ = 2n+3m−(n− n̂) = n̂+n+3m,
which is a contradiction. ❑
To prove Theorem 3, we use a similar reduction to show that Vertex-Cover-Member-Add is Σp2-
hard. The main difference is that we need an edge and two vertices for each xi and for each xi. For
the proof, see the appendix.
Vertex-Cover-Member-Select reduces to the corresponding Kemeny control problem Kemeny-
CCDC∗.
Name: E-CCDC∗
Given: An election (C, V ), a set of deletable candidates D ⊆ C, a delete limit k, and a preferred
candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Does there exist a set D′ ⊆ D of at most k deletable candidates such that p is a winner
of (C −D′, V ) using election system E?
Note that E-CCDC∗ is more structured than E-CCDC (where the set of deletable candidates is
C), since the chair can only delete from a subset of C.
Theorem 5 Kemeny-CCDC∗is Σp2-complete.
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Proof Sketch. Kemeny-Score was shown to be NP-hard by a reduction from Feedback-Arc-Set9
by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [3], which was shown to be NP-hard by Karp [32] by a reduction
from Vertex-Cover. Both these reductions are straightforward. To show the Θp2-hardness of Kemeny-
Winner, Hemaspaandra, Spakowski, and Vogel [31] define Θp2-complete versions of Vertex-Cover
and Feedback-Arc-Set, namely Vertex-Cover-Member and Feedback-Arc-Set-Member. They show
that Vertex-Cover-Member is Θp2-complete. They then show that Vertex-Cover-Member reduces to
Feedback-Arc-Set-Member, which then reduces to Kemeny-Winner. These two reductions are similar
to the NP reductions and also straightforward. The same happens in our Σp2 case: Vertex-Cover-
Member-Select easily and straightforwardly reduces to Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select, which eas-
ily and straightforwardly reduces to Kemeny-CCDC∗. For details, see the appendix. ❑
Vertex-Cover-Member-Add easily and similarly reduces to Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add (de-
fined in the appendix) and then to Kemeny-CCAC.
Theorem 6 Kemeny-CCAC is Σp2-complete.
When we try to similarly show that Kemeny-CCAV is Σp2-complete, it is easy to show that
Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add-Arcs, where we add arcs instead of vertices, is Σp2-complete. The
problem is that in the reduction from Feedback-Arc-Set to Kemeny-Score, each arc corresponds to
two voters. However, we were able to show this result for what we here call Kemeny′, the natural
variant of Kemeny from [17] where the voters do not necessarily list all of the candidates in their
votes and unlisted candidates in a vote do not contribute to the distance to the Kemeny consensus
and so do not increase the Kemeny score. In this case, one arc will correspond to one voter.
8This result holds even for four voters, using the construction from Dwork et al. [17]. For details, see the appendix.
9A feedback arc set of a directed graph is a set of arcs such that deleting this set makes the graph acyclic.
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Theorem 7 Kemeny′-CCAV is Σp2-complete.
We now turn to Young elections. We will explain how Independent-Set-Member-Delete, the
Independent-Set analogue of Vertex-Cover-Member-Delete, which is also Σp2-complete, is useful to
show Young-CCDV is Σp2-complete.
Name: Independent-Set-Member-Delete
Given: Graph G = (V,E), delete limit k, and vertex vˆ ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist a set W ⊆ V such that ‖W‖ ≤ k and vˆ is a member of a maximum
independent set of G−W?
Theorem 8 Independent-Set-Member-Delete is Σp2-complete.
The proof of the above theorem can be found in the appendix. We reduce this problem to Young-
CCDV to get the following result.
Theorem 9 Young-CCDV is Σp2-complete.
The proof of the above theorem can be found in the appendix. The same construction as used
in this proof gives a reduction to Young-CCAV.
Theorem 10 Young-CCAV is Σp2-complete.
Previous complexity results for Dodgson elections do not reduce from problems related to Vertex-
Cover or Independent-Set. However, in Dodgson there is more flexibility in how to construct the
voters in a reduction, and so we were able to directly reduce QSAT2 to Dodgson-CCDC and Dodgson-
CCAC, though the constructions are quite involved. The proofs can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 11 Dodgson-CCDC and CCAC are Σp2-complete.
Encoding Control Problems with ASP
When faced with a computationally difficult problem at the NP level there are several different
possible ways to encode the problem to harness the power of solvers for hard problems. For example,
problems in NP are often encoded for Boolean satisfiability solvers. When a problem is Σp2-complete
there are far fewer tools to use. However, we can encode our program for an answer set programming
(ASP) solver.
Answer set programming is a paradigm for encoding computationally difficult problems in a
declarative way (see, e.g., Brewka et al. [12]). Using modern ASP input languages like the one in
the Gringo grounder [24], which extends conventional ASP with aggregates functions like #sum and
#count, we can use variable names and predicates. A descriptive naming scheme usually leads to
natural encodings of problems when compared to other approaches such as encoding into Boolean
satisfiability problems.
Using ASP to solve computational problems in voting was first proposed by Konczak [34]. Recent
work by Charwat and Pfandler [13] provides winner-problem encodings for many election systems,
including systems with hard winner problems, and mentions encoding control problems as future
work. The predicates used in their encodings are arguably self-explanatory and the use of aggregates
provides succinct representations of the different voting rules they consider.
Since encoding a problem in ASP can lead to natural encodings of a problem and since ASP
can encode problems in Σp2 [18], we discuss how to encode our control problems in ASP and present
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our complete encoding for Kemeny-CCAC. However, we mention here that although ASP encodings
for NP problems (and in fact even PNP problems) are fairly straightforward and common in the
literature, encoding problems in Σp2 typically requires more advanced (and less intuitive) techniques
such as saturation [19]. We consider how this saturation technique can be used for our problems
and present an ASP encoding of Kemeny-CCAC that uses saturation. We also discuss and compare
other encoding approaches for problems at this high level of complexity.
Preliminaries on Answer Set Programming
We briefly state the relevant definitions from ASP for our encoding. (See Gebser et al. [25] for more
detailed definitions.) A disjunctive logic program is comprised of a finite set of rules of the form
a1 | . . . | ah ← b1, b2, . . . , bm, not bm+1, . . . , not bn where each of a1, . . . , ah, b1, . . . , bn are atoms and
each atom is a constant or a predicate of the form p(t1, . . . , tk) such that k ≥ 1 and each ti is
a constant or a variable. We indicate that p is a k-ary predicate by writing p/k. The left side of
the “←” is the head of the rule and the right side is the body of the rule. In the rule, “|” denotes
disjunction, “,” denotes conjunction, and “not” refers to default negation. Uppercase characters are
used to denote variables. A ground program is a program that contains no variables. A subset S of
the ground atoms satisfies a rule if {b1, . . . , bm} ⊆ S and {bm+1, . . . , bn} ∩ S = ∅ implies ai ∈ S for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ h. A model is a subset of the ground atoms that satisfies each rule. An answer set is a
minimal model with respect to set inclusion.
A fact is a rule with no body and an integrity constraint is a rule with no head. So, a fact occurs
in every answer set, and an integrity constraint eliminates answer sets where its body is satisfied.
We additionally use choice rules with cardinality constraints, which can be used to generate subsets
of ground atoms within a given bound, and aggregates such as #count and #sum that count/sum
ground atoms in a statement.
It is customary to encode a decision problem as a logic program such that the answer sets of
this program correspond to certificates for “yes” answers to the problem. Under this approach, a
“no” answer is certified by the lack of an answer set. However, there are circumstances in which a
“no” answer must be certified by an answer set (e.g., problems in coNP). The saturation technique
(see, e.g., Eiter et al. [19]) achieves this by designing a logic program that has a unique answer set
including a special token atom if and only if the answer to the original decision problem is “no.” This
answer set also contains the set S of all atoms that would be candidate certificates for “yes” answers.
Rules are added so that every time the token atom is generated, all atoms in S are generated as well,
thus “saturating” the model. Informally, this allows us to encode a “coNP check” into our program,
which along with an “NP guess,” allows us to encode problems in Σp2.
Encoding Kemeny-CCAC in ASP
We assume that the input to our problem is given as a list of facts. For E-CCAC, our input consists of
a fact for the number of registered candidates, the number of unregistered candidates, the addition
limit, the preferred candidate, and facts that describe the voters. For the voters, we follow the
approach used in Democratix [13], where each distinct vote (c1 >i · · · >i cm) is represented by
m atoms of the form p(i, j, c) meaning candidate c is the jth-preferred candidate by vote i. The
corresponding count is represented by votecount(i, k), meaning k voters have vote i.
We present our complete encoding for Kemeny-CCAC by presenting all of the rules of the en-
coding, split into “guess,” “check,” and “saturate” parts, and explaining the crucial aspects of each
part. Informally, the guess part will guess a subset of unregistered candidates to add and a consensus
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such that the preferred candidate wins. The check part (along with the saturate part) ensures that
for the guessed set of added candidates, no candidate beats the preferred candidate.
preference(1..P )← prefnum(P ). (1)
% Registered candidates.
candidate(1..C) ← rcandnum(C). (2)
% Unregistered candidates.
ucandidate((M + 1)..(M +N))← rcandnum(M),ucandnum(N). (3)
% Guess a subset of at most K candidates to add.
{candidate(C) : ucandidate(C)}K ← limit(K). (4)
candnum(N)← N = #count{candidate(C) : candidate(C)}. (5)
% Number of times candidate C is ranked below D.
wrank(P,C,D) ← p(P,X, C), p(P,Y,D), Y < X. (6)
wrankC(C,D,N) ← candidate(C), candidate(D),
N = #sum{V C, P : votecount(P, V C),wrank(P, C,D)}. (7)
position(1..M) ← candnum(M). (8)
% Guess a consensus. (9)
gpref(X,C) | ungpref(X,C)← position(X), candidate(C). (10)
← gpref(X,C), gpref(Y,C), X 6= Y. (11)
← gpref(X,C), gpref(X,D), D 6= C. (12)
← grepf(X,C), ungpref(X,C). (13)
% Loop checks if all possible positions for a given cand. are in ungpref.
npos(X,Y ) ← position(X), Y = X + 1. (14)
countTo(C, 1) ← ungpref(1, C). (15)
countTo(C,X) ← countTo(C, Y ), npos(Y,X), ungpref(X,C). (16)
← countTo(C,X), candidate(C), candnum(X). (17)
% In the guessed consensus C > D. (18)
rank(C,D) ← gpref(X,C), gpref(Y,D), X < Y. (19)
% Number of votes that disagree on C and D. (20)
gwrankC(C,D,N) ← rank(C,D),wrankC(C,D,N). (21)
← preferredCand(X), gpref(Y,X), position(Y ), Y 6= 1. (22)
Figure 1: Rules of the guess part of Kemeny-CCAC.
Figure 1 shows guess part of Kemeny-CCAC that assumes an input as described in
Democratix [13], but extended with predicates for the control problem. We start by guessing (with
a choice rule) a subset of at most K of the unregistered candidates to add to the election and we
update the number of candidates (candnum/1). We then define predicates wrank/3 and wrankC/3
to define the number of times that a candidate is ranked “worse” than another in the given election,
and we guess a consensus. This generally follows what is done in Democratix [13]. Specifically, we
follow the naming conventions for different predicates, and rules 6, 7, 19, and 21 are from Democratix.
However, our rules to guess a consensus (gpref/2) are more involved, since we use a head disjunction.
Figure 2 shows the rules of the check part of Kemeny-CCAC. The check part essentially checks
that given the added candidates from the guess, there is no candidate that beats the preferred
candidate. Note that this is quite similar to the guess part (Figure 1). However what were integrity
constraints there are now rules that generate the special saturation token sat. We describe two
important aspects of the check part below.
In the check part, we start by guessing a possible consensus. This is done in the same way as the
guess part of Kemeny-CCAC. In line 33 we use a #sum aggregate that generates the saturation atom
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% Guess another consensus.
gpref′(X,C) | ungpref′(X,C)← position(X), candidate(C). (23)
sat ← gpref′(X,C), gpref′(Y,C), X 6= Y. (24)
sat ← gpref′(X,C), gpref′(X,D), D 6= C. (25)
% Loop checks if all possible positions for a given cand. are in ungpref′.
sat ← gpref′(X,C), ungpref′(X,C). (26)
countTo′(C, 1) ← ungpref′(1, C). (27)
countTo′(C,X) ← countTo′(C, Y ),npos(Y,X),ungpref′(X,C). (28)
% Saturate if all possible positions for a given candidate are in ungpref′,
% which means a candidate is not ranked in the guess.
sat ← countTo′(C,X), candidate(C), candnum(X). (29)
% In the guessed consensus C > D.
rank′(C,D) ← gpref′(X,C), gpref′(Y,D), X < Y. (30)
% Number of votes that disagree on C and D. (31)
gwrankC′(C,D,N)← rank′(C,D),wrankC(C,D,N). (32)
sat ← #sum{M,C1, C2, pos : gwrankC′(C1, C2,M);
−N,D1, D2, neg : gwrankC(D1, D2, N)} >= 0. (33)
sat ← preferredCand(X), gpref′(1, X). (34)
Figure 2: Rules of the check part of Kemeny-CCAC.
if a candidate other than the preferred candidate has a lower Kemeny score. Note that the use of
saturation-dependent aggregates may causes undesirable behavior in the check part of an encoding
and the interpretation of aggregates is solver dependent. However, the interpretation of aggregates
in Clingo 4 (see Harrison et al. [27]) allows us to use the #sum aggregate in this way. We mention
that our use of aggregates here follows how they are used in the saturation encodings in Abseher et
al. [1].
gpref′(X,C)← position(X), candidate(C), sat. (35)
ungpref′(X,C) ← position(X), candidate(C), sat. (36)
possibleCount(0..X)← voternum(X). (37)
gwrankC′(C,D,N)← candidate(C), candidate(D),
possibleCount(N), sat. (38)
rank
′
(C,D) ← candidate(C), candidate(D), sat. (39)
countTo′(C,N) ← candidate(C), position(N), sat. (40)
← not sat. (41)
Figure 3: Rules of the saturation part of Kemeny-CCAC.
The final part of our encoding is the saturation step. Figure 3 shows the rules that ensure that an
“incorrect” guess for the check program will cause all of the predicates that depend on the guessed
consensus gpref′/2 to have all possible values in the stable model, thus saturating the solution.
Combining the guess, check, and saturate parts we obtain our complete ASP program that is
satisfiable if and only if there is a subset of unregistered candidates that can be added such that the
preferred candidate is a winner.
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Instance # Reg. # Unreg. # Voters Seconds Control Possible
ED-9-2 5 2 153 1.79† No
ED-9-1 7 2 146 368.036‡ No
ED-15-48 8 2 4 193.133‡ Yes
ED-15-78 9 3 4 78.132‡ Yes
ED-6-4 11 3 9 3.619† No
Table 2: Details on some of the Preflib instances we were able to solve. The times reported were obtained
on AMD Opteron(tm) 6180 SE (†) and AMD Opteron(tm) 6282 SE (‡) processors.
The above encoding for Kemeny-CCAC is not as straightforward as ASP encodings for problems
at the NP level, but we still have a close relationship to the definition of the problem and retain easy
adaptability to minor changes in the problem description. For example, it is not difficult to change
the above encoding to work for Kemeny-CCDC.
As with many declarative problem solving tools, there is a trade-off between expressibility and
performance. In our tests using Clingo 4.5.4 and Preflib [35] (the standard dataset of real-world
preference data), we noticed the above encoding suffers from the so-called “grounding bottleneck.”
That is, even on instances of Kemeny-CCAC with around 10 candidates, we are faced with pro-
hibitively large programs after all variables are instantiated. This is in part due to the use of loops
in saturation (which is the standard way to replace default negation, the use of which is limited in
saturation), which were found in related work on encoding Σp2-complete problems in ASP to have a
strong negative impact on performance [23]. For a preliminary test of our encoding, we attempted
to solve the Kemeny-CCAC problem for all elections with 4 or more candidates having complete
strict order votes10 making the first candidate the preferred candidate and holding out the last fifth
of the candidates as unregistered with an add limit equal to one third of the number of unregistered
candidates. There were 215 elections in total, and we were able to solve 114 of them using a timeout
of 1 hour and a limit of 16GB of memory. Some noteworthy instances we could solve are summa-
rized in Table 2. Of the 101 instances that we were not able to solve, 56 ran out of memory and
the rest timed out. Despite its limitations, our encoding is an important starting point for future
optimization and comparison of techniques. In particular, we are interested in how techniques for
overcoming the grounding bottleneck such as rewriting large rules [7] can improve the performance
of our encoding.
Related Encoding Approaches
We presented an encoding of Kemeny-CCAC using the saturation technique since it is the standard
technique to encode Σp2-complete problems in ASP and a starting point for exploring how these
problems can be encoded. There are alternatives to our approach.
Eiter and Polleres [20] address the issue of having to use advanced techniques, like saturation,
when writing ASP encodings of Σp2 problems by providing a template “meta-interpreter” and a
transformation of ASP programs that can, together, be used to integrate a program that guesses
a solution to the Σp2 problem with a program that checks whether the guessed solution is incor-
rect. Their combination amounts to a “guess and check” encoding of a Σp2 problem.
11 However, this
approach does not support ASP programs with aggregates (e.g., #count), which leads to more com-
plex and somewhat less intuitive programs. To work around this issue, one could use the lp2normal
tool [9], which transforms ASP programs with aggregates into equivalent ASP programs without
aggregates.
10http://www.preflib.org/data/format.php#soc
11Note this is different and much more involved than the guess and check technique for NP problems from, e.g., Eiter
et al. [19].
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The work by Gebser et al. [26] also addresses ASP encodings for problems with complexity
higher than NP with a different metaprogramming approach that does support aggregates by using
optimization rules.
The framework of stable-unstable semantics by Bogaerts et al. [8] provides a similar “guess and
check” strategy for solving problems in Σp2. They point out that an advantage of the stable-unstable
semantics is they can be easily extended to represent problems at any level of the polynomial hierar-
chy. In their implementation guess and check programs are each normalized, essentially discarding
aggregates altogether.
It is an interesting direction for future work to determine how the performance of the above
techniques and alternative paradigms for constraint satisfaction compare with saturation encodings
for very hard control problems in terms of implementation and adaptability.
Future Work
In addition to the future work on ASP described at the end of the previous section, it will be
interesting to see if our newly-defined simple Σp2-complete problems will be useful in proving other
problems Σp2-hard, in particular the remaining control cases and other election-attack problems such
as manipulation for systems with hard winner problems.
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Appendix
Kemeny
Proof of Theorem 5: Kemeny-CCDC∗ is Σp2-complete
Kemeny-Score was shown to be NP-hard by a reduction from Feedback-Arc-Set by Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick [3], which in turn was shown to be NP-hard by Karp [32]. The complete proof of the
NP-hardness of Kemeny-Score can be viewed as consisting of the following three steps.
1. Vertex-Cover is NP-hard [32].
2. Vertex-Cover ≤pm Feedback-Arc-Set [32].
3. Feedback-Arc-Set ≤pm Kemeny-Score [3].
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Kemeny-Winner was shown to be Θp2-hard by a chain of three reductions, basically a “lifted”
version of the NP-hardness proof for Kemeny-Score. For the lifted-to-Θp2 version, Hemaspaandra,
Spakowski, and Vogel [31] define suitable Θp2-complete equivalent problems, and show the following.
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1. Vertex-Cover-Member is Θp2-hard.
2. Vertex-Cover-Member ≤pm Feedback-Arc-Set-Member.
3. Feedback-Arc-Set-Member ≤pm Kemeny-Winner.
In order to show that Kemeny-CCDC∗ is Σp2-hard, we lift the reductions to Σ
p
2. We already
defined an appropriate Σp2-complete analogue of Vertex-Cover and below we define an appropriate
Σp2-complete analogue of Feedback-Arc-Set, and we show the following.
1. Vertex-Cover-Member-Select is Σp2-hard (Lemma 4).
2. Vertex-Cover-Member-Select ≤pm Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select (Lemma 12).
3. Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select ≤pm Kemeny-CCDC
∗ (Lemma 13).
The Σp2-complete analogue of Feedback-Arc-Set is defined as follows.
Name: Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select
Given: Irreflexive and antisymmetric directed graph G = (V,A), a set V ′ ⊆ V − {vˆ} of deletable
vertices, delete limit k, and vertex vˆ ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist a set W ⊆ V ′ of at most k deletable vertices such that some minimum
size feedback arc set of G−W contains all arcs entering vˆ?
The second and third parts of the lifting use similar constructions as in the NP, Θp2, and P
NP
cases. As we saw previously in the proof Lemma 4, the proof that Vertex-Cover-Member-Select is
Σp2-hard requires significantly more work.
Lemma 12 Vertex-Cover-Member-Select ≤pm Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select.
Proof. Given a graph G, define digraph f(G) = (V̂ , A) as in the standard reduction from Vertex-
Cover to Feedback-Arc-Set from [32].
1. V̂ = {v, v′ | v ∈ V }.
2. A = {(v, v′) | v ∈ V } ∪ {(v′, w), (w′, v) | {v, w} ∈ E}.
We know from [31, Lemma 4.8] that for every graph G′ and vertex vˆ in G′, G′ has a minimum
size vertex cover containing vˆ if and only if f(G′) has a minimum size feedback arc set containing
(vˆ, vˆ′), which is the only arc entering vˆ′.
Our reduction from Vertex-Cover-Member-Select to Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select maps
(G, V ′, k, vˆ) to (H,V ′−{vˆ}, k, vˆ′), where H = f(G). Let W ⊆ V ′−{vˆ}. Then from [31, Lemma 4.8],
G−W has a minimum size vertex cover containing vˆ if and only if f(G−W ) has a minimum size
feedback arc set containing (vˆ, vˆ′), which is the only arc entering vˆ′.
Now consider H . Note that if we delete a vertex v, we do not have any cycles going through v′
and so A′ is a minimum feedback arc set of H −W if and only if A′ is a minimum feedback arc set
12Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [22] recently showed a similar “lifting” to PNP, to show that Kemeny-Winner for
weighted elections (elections where each voter has a corresponding integral weight) and for high-multiplicity elections
(where the voters are represented as a list of distinct votes and their corresponding counts) is hard for PNP.
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of H −W − {v′ | v ∈ W}. Since H −W − {v′ | v ∈ W} = f(G−W ), it follows that G −W has a
minimum size vertex cover containing vˆ if and only if H −W has a minimum size feedback arc set
containing (vˆ, vˆ′), which is the only arc entering vˆ′. ❑
Lemma 13 Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select ≤pm Kemeny-CCDC*.
Proof. We use the construction from [3]. Given an irreflexive and antisymmetric digraph G =
(C,A), let C be the set of candidates and use McGarvey’s construction [36] to construct in polynomial
time a set of voters such that for every arc (v, w) in A, there are exactly two more voters who prefer v
to w than who prefer w to v and if there are no arcs between v and w then the same number of voters
prefer v to w as w to v. From the proof of Lemma 4.2 of [31], it holds that for every C′ ⊆ C and for
every c ∈ C′ that some minimum feedback arc set of (C′, A∩ (C′×C′)) contains all arcs entering c if
and only if c is a Kemeny winner of (C′, V ). This then shows that Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select
reduces to Kemeny-CCDC*. ❑
This completes the proof that Kemeny-CCDC∗ is Σp2-complete.
Do we always get this jump from a Θp2-complete winner problem to a Σ
p
2-complete control prob-
lem? Dwork et al. [17] show that Kemeny-Winner is already NP-hard if we have four voters. And
Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [22] show that Kemeny-Winner for four voters is still Θp2-complete.
Certainly the voter control cases for Kemeny with four voters are still in Θp2, and the control by
adding voters and control by deleting voters cases are clearly Θp2-complete. What about the candidate
control cases?
Theorem 14 Kemeny-CCDC∗ is Σp2-complete, even for four voters.
Proof. To show hardness, we argue as in the proof that Kemeny-Winner for four voters is Θp2-hard
from [22].
Given an irreflexive and antisymmetric digraph G = (V,A) and vertex vˆ ∈ V , we first compute
an irreflexive and antisymmetric digraph Ĝ as done in [17]. Ĝ = (V̂ , Â) such that V̂ = V ∪ A and
Â = {(v, (v, w)), ((v, w), w) | (v, w) ∈ A}. Let W ⊆ V −{vˆ}. Note that G−W has a feedback arc set
of size ℓ that contains all arcs entering vˆ if and only if Ĝ −W has a feedback arc set of size ℓ that
contains all arcs entering vˆ. It follows that (G, V ′, k, vˆ) is in Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select if and
only if (Ĝ, V ′, k, vˆ) is in Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Select. Now apply the reduction from Feedback-
Arc-Set-Member-Select to Kemeny-CCDC∗ from Lemma 13 to (Ĝ, V ′, k, vˆ). The construction from
Dwork et al. [17] shows that we need only four voters in the election. ❑
Proof of Theorem 6: Kemeny-CCAC is Σp2-complete
Membership follows from Corollary 2. The proof of hardness is similar to the proof of hardness for
CCDC∗: We define suitable Σp2-complete versions of Vertex-Cover and Feedback-Arc-Set and show
the following.
1. Vertex-Cover-Member-Add is Σp2-hard.
2. Vertex-Cover-Member-Add ≤pm Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add.
3. Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add ≤pm Kemeny-CCAC.
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Name: Vertex-Cover-Member-Add
Given: Graph G = (V ∪ V ′, E), set of addable vertices V ′, addition limit k, and vertex vˆ ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist a set W ⊆ V ′ of at most k addable vertices such that vˆ is a member of
a minimum vertex cover of (V ∪W,E)?13
Name: Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add
Given: Irreflexive and antisymmetric directed graph G = (V ∪ V ′, A), a set V ′ of addable vertices,
addition limit k, and vertex vˆ ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist a set W ⊆ V ′ of at most k addable vertices such that some minimum
size feedback arc set of (V ∪W,A) contains all arcs entering vˆ?
The proof that Vertex-Cover-Member-Add reduces to Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add is similar
to the proof of Lemma 12 and the proof that Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add reduces to Kemeny-
CCAC is similar to the proof of Lemma 13. This leaves the following lemma to prove.
Lemma 15 Vertex-Cover-Member-Add is Σp2-complete.
Proof. The upper bound is immediate. For the lower bound, we will again reduce from QSAT2.
We will modify the construction of the proof of Lemma 4, which showed Σp2-hardness for Vertex-
Cover-Member-Select. Let H be the graph from the proof of Lemma 4. We add an addable vertex
x′i connected only to xi and an addable vertex xi
′ connected only to xi. So, V = V (H), V
′ =
{x′i, xi
′ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and E = E(H) ∪ {{xi, x
′
i}, {xi, xi
′} | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.14
Let W ⊆ V ′. Let H ′ = (V ∪W,E). Some relevant properties of H ′ are as follows.
1. If X is a vertex cover, then X is still a vertex cover if we replace x′i by xi and xi
′ by xi. In
particular, this implies that there is a minimum vertex cover that does not contain any vertex
in W .
2. Every vertex cover of H ′ contains at least one of {xi, xi}, at least one of {yi, yi}, at least three
of {aj, bj , cj , dj}, at least one of {xi, x′i} for x
′
i ∈W , and at least one of {xi, xi} for xi
′ ∈W .
3. If X is a vertex cover of size 2n+ 3m, then vˆ 6∈ X and V ′ ∩X = ∅ and X ∩ {xi, xi, yi, yi | 1 ≤
i ≤ n} corresponds to a satisfying assignment for φ.
4. If α is a satisfying assignment for φ, then there is a vertex cover X of size 2n+ 3m of (V,E)
such that X ∩ {xi, xi, yi, yi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to this assignment.
5. If for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, {x′i, xi
′} 6⊆ W , then there is a vertex cover of size 2n + 3m + 1 that
includes vˆ and that does not contain any vertex in W .
We will show that ∃x1 · · · ∃xn¬(∃y1 · · · ∃ynφ(x1, . . . , xn,
y1, . . . , yn)) if and only if there exists a set W ⊆ V ′ of at most n addable vertices such that vˆ is a
member of a minimum vertex cover of (V ∪W,E).
First assume that ∃x1 · · · ∃xn¬(∃y1 · · · ∃ynφ(x1, . . . , xn,
y1, . . . , yn)). Let α ∈ {0, 1}n be an assignment to x1 · · ·xn such that φ(α1, . . . , αn, y1, . . . , yn) is not
satisfiable. LetW be the set of vertices in V ′ corresponding to α, i.e.,W = {x′i | αi = 1}∪{xi
′ | αi =
0}. Then (V ∪W,E) does not have a vertex cover of size 2n+3m (by 3), and (V ∪W,E) does have
a vertex cover of size 2n+ 3m+ 1 that includes vˆ (by 5).
13We slightly abuse notation by writing (V ∪W,E) instead of (V ∪W,E′), where E′ is the restriction of E to V ∪W .
14We can not simply use H with the x-vertices as addable vertices, since in that case d would be a member of a
minimum vertex cover after adding any nonempty set of vertices that corresponds to an assignment.
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For the converse, suppose that W is a set of at most n vertices from {x′i, xi
′ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} such
that vˆ is a member of a minimum vertex cover of (V ∪W,E). IfW corresponds to an assignment α, it
is easy to see that φ(α1, . . . , αn, y1, . . . , yn) is not satisfiable. But W does not necessarily correspond
to an assignment, since it is possible for W to contain neither or both of {x′i, xi
′}. Let n̂ be the
number of {x′i, xi
′} pairs that are unadded, i.e., for which {x′i, xi
′} ∩W = ∅. Note (by 2) that the
size of a vertex cover of (V ∪W,E) is at least ‖W‖+ n̂+n+3m, and that vertex covers of that size
do not include vˆ. Since vˆ is a member of a minimum size vertex cover of (V ∪W,E), it follows that
(V ∪W,E) does not have a vertex cover of size ‖W‖+ n̂+ n+ 3m.
Let α ∈ {0, 1}n be an assignment to x1 · · ·xn that is consistent with W , in the sense that for all
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ifW∩{x′i, xi
′} = {x′i}, then αi = 1 and ifW∩{x
′
i, xi
′} = {xi
′}, then αi = 0. To complete
the proof, suppose for a contradiction that φ(α1, . . . , αn, y1, . . . , yn) is satisfiable. Then (by 4) (V,E)
has a vertex cover X of size 2n+ 3m such that X ∩ {xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to α. Clearly,
X∪{xi | x′i ∈ W}∪{xi | xi
′ ∈ W} is a vertex cover of (V ∪W,E). Since ‖X∩({xi | x′i ∈W}∪{xi | xi
′ ∈
W})‖ = n − n̂, the size of this vertex cover is ‖W‖ + ‖X‖ − (n + n̂) = ‖W‖ + n̂ + n + 3m, which
implies that (V ∪W,E) has a vertex cover of size ‖W‖+ n̂+n+3m, which is a contradiction. ❑
Proof of Theorem 7: Kemeny′-CCAV is Σp2-complete
Note that in the reduction from feedback arc set problems to Kemeny control problems, vertices
correspond to candidates and arcs roughly correspond to voters. Also note that arc (v, v′) in Feedback-
Arc-Set-Member-Add basically correspond to vertex v. And so we can easily define a version of
Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add where we add arcs instead of vertices.
Name: Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add-Arcs
Given: Irreflexive and antisymmetric directed graph G = (V,A ∪ B), a set B of addable arcs,
addition limit k, and vertex vˆ ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist a set B′ ⊆ B of at most k addable arcs such that some minimum size
feedback arc set of (V,A ∪B′) contains all arcs entering vˆ?
It is easy to see that Vertex-Cover-Member-Add≤pm Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add-Arcs: Given
a graph G = (V ∪W,E), define digraph f(G) = (V̂ , A∪B) as in the standard reduction from Vertex-
Cover to Feedback-Arc-Set from [32], with the set of addable arcs B being the arcs corresponding
to the addable vertices W .
1. V̂ = {v, v′ | v ∈ V ∪W}.
2. A = {(v, v′) | v ∈ V } ∪ {(v′, w), (w′, v) | {v, w} ∈ E}.
3. B = {(v, v′) | v ∈W}.
Our reduction from Vertex-Cover-Member-Add to Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add-Arcs maps
(G,W, k, vˆ) to ((V̂ , A ∪B), B, k, vˆ′).
As mentioned previously, in the reduction from feedback arc set problems to Kemeny control
problems, vertices correspond to candidates and arcs roughly correspond to voters. If the voters
vote with total orders, each arc corresponds to two voters: arc a→ b corresponds to a voter voting
a > b > C − {a, b} and a voter voting (C − {a, b})r > a > b [36].
There exist variations of Kemeny where the voters do not necessarily list all of the candidates
in their votes. Dwork et al. [17] consider a natural variant of Kemeny, which we here call Kemeny′,
where unlisted candidates in a vote do not contribute to the distance to the Kemeny consensus and
so do not increase the Kemeny score. (The Kemeny consensus is still a complete total order.) So, in
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this model, a voter voting a > b corresponds exactly to an arc a → b. This gives a straightforward
reduction from Feedback-Arc-Set-Member-Add-Arcs to Kemeny′-CCAV.
Young
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. Independent-Set-Member-Delete is clearly in Σp2. We will show that Independent-Set-
Member-Delete is Σp2-complete by reducing the Σ
p
2-complete problem Generalized-Node-Deletion
to it, in which we are given a graph G, and two integers k and ℓ, and we ask if we can delete at most
k vertices such that the remaining graph does not contain Kℓ+1, a clique of size ℓ + 1 [42]. For the
reduction, simply output (H, k, vˆ), where H is the graph G×Kℓ, and vˆ is a vertex in Kℓ.
If we can delete at most k vertices in G such that the remaining graph does not contain a clique
of size ℓ+ 1, then G after deletion does not contain an independent set of size ℓ+ 1. It follows that
after deletion, Kℓ is a largest independent set in H and vˆ is an element of this independent set.
For the converse, suppose we delete at most k vertices from H such that vˆ is a member of a
largest independent set. This independent set has size at most ℓ, and so after deletion, G does not
have an independent set of size ℓ+ 1. ❑
Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. For G a graph, α(G) is the independence number of G, i.e., the size of a maximum
independent set of G. For v a vertex, αv(G) is the size of a maximum independent set of G that
contains v.
Given a graph G = (V,E), a delete limit k ≤ ‖V ‖, and a vertex vˆ ∈ V , below we construct
an election with two special candidates p and q such that our instance is a positive instance of
Independent-Set-Member-Delete if and only if we can make the Young score15 of p at least 2 and at
least as high as the Young score of q by deleting at most k voters.
This is not quite the same as making p a Young winner, since other candidates could have higher
scores and since it is also possible for a Young winner to have a score below 2. However, this can
easily be handled as follows: We can use the trick from [41] to change the election such that the
Young scores of p and q remain the same, the Young scores of all other candidates are at most 2,
and such that there is a candidate with a Young score of at least 2.
We use candidate q to witness the size of a maximum independent set. The main idea on how
to do this is implicit in the construction from Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel [41]. The new twist is
to use candidate p to witness the size of a maximum independent set containing vˆ. In order to do
so, we make sure that all voters corresponding to vertices connected to vˆ are not in a set of voters
that realizes the Young score of p, by making these voters maximally unattractive to p, by ranking
p last.
Given a graph G = (V,E), a delete limit k ≤ ‖V ‖, and a vertex vˆ ∈ V , without loss of generality
assume that G has no isolated vertices and that for every set W of at most k vertices, α(G−W ) ≥ 3
(the latter property can for example be ensured by adding two (k+1)-cliques to G). Let the candidate
set be E ∪ {a, p, q} and let the voter set consist of:
Type IA For each v ∈ V such that {v, vˆ} 6∈ E, one voter corresponding to v voting
({e ∈ E | v ∈ e} > a > q > p > · · · ).
15The Young score of a candidate is the size of a largest subset of the voters that make it a weak Condorcet winner.
A Young winner is a candidate with highest Young score.
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Type IB For each v ∈ V such that {v, vˆ} ∈ E, one voter corresponding to v voting
({e ∈ E | v ∈ e} > a > q > · · · > p).
Type II One voter voting (p > q > · · · > a).
Type III 2‖V ‖ voters voting (· · · > p > q > a).
Suppose X is a set of at most k voters that we delete. If X contains the voter of Type II, the
Young scores of p and q are 0 (since there are no isolated vertices). If not, let W be the set of of
vertices corresponding to the Type-I voters in X . Careful and tedious inspection shows that the
Young score of q is 2α(G−W ) (this Young score is realized by a set of voters whose Type-I voters
correspond to a maximum independent set) and that the Young score of p is 2αvˆ(G − W ) (this
Young score is realized by a set of voters whose Type-I voters are all of Type-IA and correspond to
a maximum independent set that contains vˆ). For details, see the section below. ❑
Details of the proof of Theorem 9
Given graph G = (V,E), a delete limit k ≤ ‖V ‖, and a vertex vˆ ∈ V , such that G has no isolated
vertices and for every set W of at most k vertices, α(G−W ) ≥ 3, we will show that ((V,E), k, vˆ) is
a positive instance of Independent-Set-Member-Delete if and only if we can make the Young score
of p at least 2 and at least as high as the Young score of q by deleting at most k voters.
Let W ⊆ V be a set of at most k vertices such that vˆ is in a maximum independent set of G−W .
Delete the voters corresponding to W . We will show that the Young score of p is at least 2 and at
least as high as the Young score of q. Let Ŵ be a maximum independent set of G −W such that
vˆ ∈ Ŵ . Then all the voters corresponding to Ŵ are of Type IA. It is easy to see that p and q are
weak Condorcet winners in the set of voters that consists of the voters corresponding to Ŵ , the
voter of Type II, and ‖Ŵ‖ − 1 voters of Type III. It follows that the Young scores of p and q are at
least 2α(G−W ). It also follows from the argument from [41, Lemma 2.4] that the Young score of q
is at most 2α(G−W ).
For the converse, suppose X is a set of at most k voters such that after deletion, p’s Young score
is at least 2 and at least as high as q’s Young score. Then X does not contain the voter of Type II.
Let W be the set of vertices corresponding to the Type-I voters in X . Then the Young score of q
is 2α(G−W ). Let X̂ be a set of voters of size 2α(G−W ) such that p is a weak Condorcet winner
of X̂. Without loss of generality, assume that X̂ does not contain voters of Type IB (if it does, we
can replace such a voter by a voter of Type III). In order for p to be a weak Condorcet winner, the
vertices corresponding to the voters of Type I in X̂ form an independent set of G −W . Since all
voters in X̂ of Type I are of Type IA, this independent set contains no vertices connected to vˆ and
so we can safely add vˆ to this independent set, giving us an independent set containing vˆ of size at
least α(G −W ).
Dodgson Elections
In this section we consider the complexity of control for Dodgson elections [16]. Recall that the
Dodgson score of a candidate c using the Dodgson election system is the minimum number of
swaps between adjacent candidates in votes such that c is a Condorcet winner and that the candi-
date(s) with the minimum score are the winner(s) of the Dodgson election. We will use the notation
DodgsonScore(c) to denote the Dodgson score of a candidate c in a given election. As we did with
Kemeny, we first consider the complexity of CCDC∗.
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Theorem 16 Dodgson-CCDC∗ is Σp2-complete.
Proof. In our hardness proofs for control for Kemeny and Young elections, our approach was to
define a new simple Σp2-complete analogue of Vertex-Cover or Independent-Set (the problems used to
show NP-hardness for the score problems) to then reduce to a control problem. Dodgson score was
originally shown NP-hard by a reduction from Exact-Cover-by-3-Sets [3]. [29] provides a reduction
from Three-Dimensional-Matching (3DM) as part of the proof of Θp2-completeness of the winner
problem. There does exist a simple Σp2-complete analogue of 3DM [37]. However, this analogue does
not straightforwardly reduce to Dodgson control problems.
Fortunately, in Dodgson there is a lot of flexibility in how to construct the voters in a reduction,
and so we will directly reduce QSAT2 to Dodgson-CCDC
∗, though the construction is quite involved.
To better understand our reduction, it helps to first consider a reduction from 3SAT to the Dodgson
score problem, in which we ask if the Dodgson score of a distinguished candidate is at most k.
Let φ(z1, . . . , zn) be a Boolean formula in 3cnf, where φ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm and for each
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ψi = ℓi,1∨ ℓi,2∨ ℓi,3. Without loss of generality, let n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1. We now construct
an instance of the Dodgson score problem. An example of this construction is given in Example 1
below. We begin by showing the core parts of the construction (Blocks I and II).
Let C = {ẑ1, . . . , ẑn} ∪ {c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {ci,1, ci,2, ci,3, . . . , cm,1, cm,2, cm,3} ∪ {q, b}. Let there be
the following voters. Note that “· · · ” in a vote denotes that the remaining candidates are strictly
ranked in a arbitrary, fixed, and easy to compute order. Similarly, a set in a vote denotes that the
candidates in that set are strictly ranked with respect to that order.
Block I For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3,
• One voter voting: (ci > ci,j > q > · · · ).
Block II For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
• One voter voting: (ẑt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > q > · · · ).
• One voter voting: (ẑt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > q > · · · ).
The above election can be easily padded so that the following properties hold.
• q needs one vote over each ci, each ci,j , and each ẑi, and no votes over b.
• One swap in votes other than the Block I and Block II votes does not give q a vote over any
of the ci, ci,j , or ẑi candidates, i.e., one swap in votes other than Block I and Block II votes is
useless.
Note that for each ci,j candidate, 2n+3m− 2 (of the 2n+3m) voters in Blocks I and II prefer q
to ci,j , that for each ẑi candidate, 2n+ 3m− 2 voters in Blocks I and II prefer q to ẑi, and that for
each ci candidate, 2n+ 3m− 3 of the voters in Blocks I and II prefer q to ci. We can ensure that q
needs one vote over each of these candidates (by making q tie pairwise with each of these candidates)
by adding the following 2n+3m−4 voters. We use the buffer candidate “b” to ensure that one swap
outside of Blocks I and II does not give q a vote over any of the ci, ci,j , or ẑi candidates.
Block III
• One voter voting: (· · · > b > q > {c1, . . . , cm}).
• 2n+ 3m− 5 voters voting: (· · · > b > q).
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We will show in Lemma 17 that φ is satisfiable if and only if DodgsonScore(q) ≤ 4m+ n.
Before proving the correctness of this construction, let’s first consider the following example,
which will show how assignments to variables correspond to swaps between adjacent candidates.
Example 1 Given the formula φ(z1, z2) = (z1 ∨ z2 ∨ z1) ∧ (z2 ∨ z1 ∨ z2), our construction gives the
following election.
C = {c1, c2, c1,1, c1,2, c1,3, c2,1, c2,2, c2,3, ẑ1, ẑ2, q, b}, and we have the following voters. (We do not
name the voters in Block III since we do not need to swap q in these votes.)
Block I
• v1 voting: (c1 > c1,1 > q > · · · ).
• v2 voting: (c1 > c1,2 > q > · · · ).
• v3 voting: (c1 > c1,3 > q > · · · ).
• v4 voting: (c1 > c2,1 > q > · · · ).
• v5 voting: (c1 > c2,2 > q > · · · ).
• v6 voting: (c1 > c2,3 > q > · · · ).
Block II
• v7 voting: (ẑ1 > c1,1 > c1,3 > q > · · · ).
• v8 voting: (ẑ1 > c2,2 > q > · · · ).
• v9 voting: (ẑ2 > c2,3 > q > · · · ).
• v10 voting: (ẑ2 > c1,2 > c2,1 > q > · · · ).
Block III
• One voter voting: (· · · > b > q > c1 > c2).
• Five voters voting: (· · · > b > q).
It is easy to see that the assignment z1 = 1, z2 = 0 is a satisfying assignment for φ. We will now
show that this implies that DodgsonScore(q) ≤ 10.
Swapping q over a ci,j candidate in its Block I vote will correspond to that clause literal being true
and swapping q over a ci,j candidate in its Block II vote will correspond to that clause literal being
false. Since z1 is true, swap q with c1,1 in v1 and c1,3 in v3 (these correspond to positive z1-literals in
φ) and then in Block II swap q with c2,2 and ẑ1 in v8 (this vote corresponds to the negated z1-literals).
Similarly, since z2 is false, swap q with c1,2 in v2, swap q with c2,1 in v4, and then in Block II swap
q with c2,3 and ẑ2 in v9. This takes eight swaps for q to gain one vote over each of the ẑi and ci,j
candidates.
Note that since φ is satisfiable, for each clause there exists at least one true literal, and we just
swapped q over the true clause literals in Block I. So, to gain one vote over c1, swap q with c1 in
v1 (we already swapped q with c1,1) and to gain one vote over c2, swap q with c2 in v2 (we already
swapped q with c1,2). This takes exactly two swaps. Thus the Dodgson score of q is ≤ 10.
We will now show the following lemma.
Lemma 17 φ is satisfiable if and only if DodgsonScore(q) ≤ 4m+ n
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Proof. First suppose that φ(z1, . . . , zn) is satisfiable. Fix an assignment α ∈ {0, 1}n for φ. We
argue as in Example 1.
Recall that q needs one vote over each ẑi, each ci, and each ci,j candidate. For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n
if zt is false in the assignment (i.e., αt = 0) then for each ci,j such that ℓi,j = zt, swap q with ci,j in
the corresponding votes in Block I and swap q up to the top in the corresponding zt vote in Block II,
and if zt is true in the assignment (i.e., αt = 1) then for each ci,j such that ℓi,j = zt, swap q with
ci,j in the corresponding votes in Block I and swap q up to the top in the corresponding zt vote in
Block II. For example, if zt is false in the satisfying assignment do the following.
• Swap q with ci,j in each Block I vote (ci > ci,j > q > · · · ) for which ℓi,j = zt to get
(ci > q > ci,j > · · · ).
• Swap q up to the top in the Block II vote (ẑt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > q > · · · ) to get (q > ẑt >
{ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > · · · ).
This takes 3m+ n swaps.
Since α is a satisfying assignment for φ we know that for each clause there exists a clause literal
that is true. In our election, this means that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there exists a j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, such
that q has been swapped in the vote (ci > ci,j > q > · · · ) to get (ci > q > ci,j > · · · ). So with a
total of m swaps q can gain one vote over each clause candidate ci. This all takes a total of 4m+ n
swaps.
For the converse, suppose that DodgsonScore(q) ≤ 4m+ n. The Dodgson score of q will always
be at least 4m+n, since q must gain one vote over 4m+n candidates (each ci, each ci,j , and each ẑi
candidate). To avoid “wasting” swaps, q must swap only with these candidates and only in Block I
and Block II, since these are the only votes were q is directly adjacent to these candidates. Since
each swap must gain a necessary vote, for each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we either swap q up in the Block II
vote (ẑt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > q > · · · ) to get (q > ẑt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > · · · ) or swap q up in the
Block II vote (ẑt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > q > · · · ) to get (q > ẑt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = zt} > · · · ). Note that
this is the only way for q to gain one vote over ẑt without wasting swaps. In the first case set zt to
false and in the second case set zt to true. This gives us a satisfying assignment for φ since for each
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, q must also swap with the clause candidate ci, which implies that for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3,
q swaps with ci,j in Block I, and since q only swaps over each of these candidates exactly once, q did
not swap with this ci,j in Block II. So ci,j corresponds to a true literal in the constructed satisfying
assignment. ❑
We will now use the idea from the reduction above to show that Dodgson-CCDC∗ is Σp2-complete.
Membership in Σp2 follows from Corollary 2. To show hardness, we reduce from QSAT2 and recall
that it is defined as all true formulas of the form ∃x1 · · · ∃xn¬(∃y1 · · · ∃ynφ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn)),
where φ is a formula in 3cnf, where φ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ψi =
ℓi,1 ∨ ℓi,2 ∨ ℓi,3. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} and X = {x1, . . . , xn} denote the positive and negative x-
literals and let Y = {y1, . . . , yn} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn} denote the positive and negative y-literals.
Without loss of generality, let n > m and n > 6. Let m̂ be the number of occurrences of y-literals,
i.e., m̂ = ‖{(i, j) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, and ℓi,j ∈ Y ∪ Y }‖. Note that m̂ ≤ 3m.
We now construct an instance of Dodgson-CCDC∗. Let the candidate set C consist of the
x-variable candidates {x̂1, . . . , x̂n}, the y-variable candidates {ŷ1, . . . , ŷn}, the clause candidates
{c1, . . . , cm}, a clause-literal candidate for each occurrence of a y-literal {ci,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤
j ≤ 3, and ℓi,j ∈ Y ∪ Y } (note that there are m̂ clause-literal candidates), the buffer candidates
{b1, b2, b3, b4}, the positive and negated x-literal candidates X ∪X and the candidates p, q, and d.
Let p be the preferred candidate of the chair, let X ∪X be the set of deletable candidates, and let
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the delete limit be 2n (i.e., we can delete any subset of X ∪X; this will be useful when we look at
CCAC). We have the following 16n+ 8m+ 2m̂− 8 voters.
Block IA For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, such that ℓi,j = yt or yt,
• One voter voting: (ci > ci,j > q > b1 > p > d > · · · ).
Block IB For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, such that ℓi,j = xt or xt,
• If ℓi,j = xt, one voter voting: (ci > xt > q > b1 > p > d > · · · ).
• If ℓi,j = xt, one voter voting: (ci > xt > q > b1 > p > d > · · · ).
Block II For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
• One voter voting: (ŷt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = yt} > q > b1 > p > d > · · · ).
• One voter voting: (ŷt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = yt} > q > b1 > p > d > · · · ).
Block III For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
• One voter voting: (x̂t > xt > p > q > d > · · · ).
• One voter voting: (x̂t > xt > p > q > d > · · · ).
Block IV
• One voter voting: (d > · · · > b2 > {c1, . . . , cm} > {all ci,j} >
{ŷ1, . . . , ŷn} > p > b1 > q).
• One voter voting: (d > · · · > b2 > {x̂1, . . . , x̂n} > q > b1 > b3 > p).
Block V
• One voter voting: (d > · · · > b2 > p > q > {c1, . . . , cm}).
• 2n+ 3m− 6 voters voting: (d > · · · > b2 > p > b1 > q).
Block VI
• 4n+m+ m̂− 2 voters voting: (p > q > d > · · · ).
• 2n+m+ m̂− 4 voters voting: (· · · > b3 > q > b4 > d > p > b1 >
b2 > X ∪X).
• 4n− 1 voters voting: (d > · · · > b2 > q > b1 > p > b3 > b4 > X ∪X).
• Two voters voting: (· · · > b3 > d > p > b4 > q > b1 > b2 > X ∪X).
Note the following about the election above.
1. q needs one vote over each x̂i, each ŷi, each ci, each ci,j , and p, and no votes over other
candidates. Note that DodgsonScore(q) ≥ 2n+m+ m̂+ 1.
2. The votes in Block IA and the Block II votes function in the same way to determine (part of)
the score of q as in the Dodgson score reduction above. And q can only gain a vote over any
of the ŷi, ci, or ci,j candidates without wasting a swap in Block I and Block II.
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3. p needs one vote over each x̂i, each ŷi, each ci, each ci,j , and q, and no votes over other
candidates. p needs at least two swaps to gain one vote over q and to accomplish this p needs
to swap over a buffer candidate. Note that DodgsonScore(p) ≥ 2n+m+ m̂+ 2.
4. d needs 2n+m+ m̂− 1 votes over q, 3 votes over p, and no votes over other candidates. Note
that regardless of which candidates in X ∪X are deleted, DodgsonScore(d) = 2n+m+ m̂+2.
5. Each candidate in C−{p, q, d} needs at least 2n+m+m̂+2 votes over d. So regardless of which
candidates in X ∪X are deleted, for each c ∈ C−{p, q, d}, DodgsonScore(c) ≥ 2n+m+ m̂+2.
Let’s consider the Dodgson score of p. It is easy to see for every X ′ ⊆ X ∪ X , in the election
(C −X ′, V ), p can gain each needed vote over the ŷi, ci, and ci,j candidates in the Block IV vote
and then use two more swaps to gain one vote over q. What remains is to show how p can gain one
vote over each of the x̂i candidates. When at least one of the {xi, xi} candidates is deleted, p can
gain one vote over the corresponding x̂i candidate in Block III, using one swap. So, we can state the
following observation.
Observation 18 For every X ′ ⊆ X ∪X,
1. The Dodgson score of p with X ′ removed is ≥ 2n+m+ m̂+ 2.
2. The Dodgson score of p with X ′ removed is 2n+m+ m̂+2 if and only if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
at least one of each xi or xi in is X
′.
We now consider the Dodgson score of q.
Lemma 19 For every X ′ ⊆ X ∪X,
1. The Dodgson score of q with X ′ removed is ≥ 2n+m+ m̂+ 1.
2. The Dodgson score of q with X ′ removed is 2n+m+ m̂+ 1 if and only if φ with x-literals in
X ′ set to true and x-literals not in X ′ set to false is satisfiable.
Proof.
1. Clearly the Dodgson score of q with X ′ removed is ≥ 2n + m + m̂ + 1, since q needs one
vote over each x̂i, each ŷi, each ci, each ci,j , and p, and does not need any votes over other
candidates.
2. Suppose that q can be made a Condorcet winner in the election (C − X ′, V ) with exactly
2n+m+ m̂+ 1 swaps. This means that every swap must gain a necessary vote, since q needs
one vote each over 2n + m + m̂ + 1 candidates. With the exception of candidate p and the
x̂i candidates, q is only ever not separated from candidates it needs votes over by a buffer
candidate in Block I and Block II. So n+m+ m̂ of these swaps must occur there. Note that q
can easily swap over p (in Block III), and the x̂i candidates (in Block IV) with exactly n + 1
swaps.
Consider the candidates deleted in X ′. If ℓi,j = xt (xt) then q can gain one vote over ci in
the corresponding Block I vote with only one swap. This will correspond to setting xt to true
(false) in the corresponding assignment and setting xt (xt) to true means that the ith clause
is true.
Now let’s consider the y-literals. Since the Dodgson score of q is 2n+m+ m̂+ 1, q can swap
over the ŷi, ci, and ci,j candidates without wasting swaps. It follows from a similar argument
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as in the proof of Lemma 17 that since q can swap over the remaining n+m+ m̂ candidates
without wasting a swap, φ with the x-literals in X ′ set to true and x-literals not in X ′ set to
false is satisfiable.
For the other direction, consider a fixed satisfying assignment for y-variables in φ, where the
assignment to the x-literals is set by the deleted candidates X ′. For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, if yt
is true (false) in the satisfying assignment, swap q up over the ci,j candidates and ŷt in the
yt (yt) vote in Block II. Then for each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, if yt is true (false) swap q with ci,j in the
corresponding ℓi,j = yt (yt) Block I votes. This takes n+m swaps and handles the ci,j and ŷi
candidates. Since we are looking at a satisfying assignment, for all i, there exists a j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
such that ci > ci,j > q has been swapped to ci > q > ci,j or xt (xt) has been deleted so that
ci > q. With k extra swaps, p beats ci pairwise for all i. q must additionally gain one vote over
p and one vote over each x̂i candidate and it is clear to see how this can be accomplished with
n+ 1 swaps. This all takes 2n+m+ m̂+ 1 swaps.
❑
We will now show that ∃x1 · · · ∃xn¬(∃y1 · · · ∃ynφ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn)) ∈ QSAT2 if and only if
there exists X ′ ⊆ X ∪X such that p is a Dodgson winner of (C −X ′, V ).
Suppose that ∃x1 · · · ∃xn¬(∃y1 · · · ∃ynφ(x1, . . . , xn,
y1, . . . , yn) ∈ QSAT2. Fix an assignment α ∈ {0, 1}
n for the x-literals such that φ is not satisfiable.
Let the candidates deleted be X ′ = {xi | αi = 1} ∪ {xi | αi = 0}. We know from Observation 18
that the Dodgson score of p with X ′ deleted is 2n +m + m̂ + 2 and by Lemma 19 we know that
DodgsonScore(q) > 2n+m+m̂+1. And as stated in the list of properties given after the construction,
the Dodgson score of each candidate in C − {p, q, d} is at least 2n +m + m̂ + 2. Additionally, the
Dodgson score of d is 2n+m+ m̂+2 regardless of which candidates in X ∪X are deleted. It follows
that p is a Dodgson winner of (C −X ′, V ).
Suppose that there exists an X ′ ⊆ X ∪X such that p is a winner. Regardless of which candidates
in X ∪X are deleted, DodgsonScore(d) = 2n+m+ m̂+ 2 and DodgsonScore(p) ≥ 2n+m+ m̂+ 2.
Since p is a winner, DodgsonScore(p) = 2n + m + m̂ + 2 and it follows from Observation 18 that
X ′ contains at least one of each {xi, xi}. Let α ∈ {0, 1}n be an assignment to the x-literals that
is consistent with the candidates in X ′, that is, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if αi = 1, then xi ∈ X ′ and
if αi = 0, then xi ∈ X ′. Suppose that φ(α1, . . . , αn, y1, . . . , yn) is satisfiable. Then by Lemma 19,
DodgsonScore(q) = 2n+m+ m̂+ 1. However, since DodgsonScore(p) = 2n+m+ m̂+ 2, p is not a
winner, which is a contradiction. It follows that φ(α1, . . . , αn, y1, . . . , yn) is not satisfiable. ❑
The analogous result for CCAC follows almost immediately.
Theorem 20 Dodgson-CCAC is Σp2-complete.
Proof. Membership in Σp2 follows from Observation 1. To show hardness, we reduce from QSAT2
and use the same construction as for the case of the proof of Theorem 16, with the obvious modi-
fication that the set of deletable candidates (X ∪X) is now the set of unregistered candidates and
the delete limit is now the addition limit of 2n. Note that p can be a winner by deleting a set of
candidates X̂ ⊆ X ∪X ′ from (C, V ) if and only if p can be made a winner by adding (X ∪X ′)− X̂
to (C − (X ∪X ′), V ), which immediately gives the result. ❑
The construction used for the proof of Dodgson-CCDC∗ can be adapted to show the following.
Theorem 21 Dodgson-CCDC is Σp2-complete.
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Proof Sketch. Membership in Σp2 follows from Corollary 2. We will adapt the construction used
in the proof of Theorem 16. Set the delete limit to n. Our main challenge is to ensure that the
arguments from the previous proof still go through when we delete up to n arbitrary candidates. We
start with Blocks I, II, III, and IV and do the following.
1. To ensure that the buffer candidates function in the same way, we replace each buffer candidate
by n+ 1 copies of that candidate.
2. We also replace the candidate “d,” which in the Dodgson-CCDC∗ proof, regardless of which
candidates in X ∪ X are deleted, always has Dodgson score equal to the minimum-possible
Dodgson score of p, by n+1 copies: {d1, . . . , dn+1}. And we replace each occurrence of d in the
construction by d1 > d2 > · · · > dn+1. This will ensure that regardless of which candidates in
C−{q} are deleted, the Dodgson score of the first di that is not deleted is the minimum-possible
Dodgson score of p. (We will mention why we do not delete q later.)
3. We now will make sure that the candidates deleted correspond to an assignment. In the
Dodgson-CCDC∗ proof, this was accomplished by the Block III votes and the x̂i candidates.
Old Block III For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
• One voter voting: (x̂t > xt > p > · · · ).
• One voter voting: (x̂t > xt > p > · · · ).
In our new construction we create 2n of each of the x̂i candidates:
{x̂11, . . . , x̂
2n
1 , . . . , x̂
1
n, . . . , x̂
2n
n } and we make sure that p needs one vote over each of these 2n
2
variables. We then change Block III to be the following 4n2 votes.
New Block III For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, and s, 1 ≤ s ≤ 2n,
• One voter voting: (x̂st > xt > p > · · · ).
• One voter voting: (x̂st > xt > p > · · · ).
Now for each xi or xi deleted, p can gain the necessary vote over each of the at least n non-
deleted x̂si candidates without wasting swaps, and so one such deletion decreases the Dodgson
score of p by at least n. Note that if for an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, both of xi and xi were deleted, or
if a candidate in C − (X ∪X) was deleted, then the Dodgson score of p would decrease by at
most 1.
In order for p to tie with “d” by deleting at most n candidates, we need to delete exactly one
of each {xi, xi}, which corresponds to an assignment. Note that this also implies that we do
not delete q.
4. In the Dodgson-CCDC∗ proof, to get its needed vote over q, p needs to waste a swap over q
and does this by swapping over a buffer candidate. Since there are now n + 1 copies of each
buffer candidate, we need to modify the votes so that p still wastes exactly one swap to gain
its vote over q. Recall the Block II votes from the Dodgson-CCDC∗ proof.
Old Block II For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
• One voter voting: (ŷt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = yt} > q > b1 > p > d > · · · ).
• One voter voting: (ŷt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = yt} > q > b1 > p > d > · · · ).
In our new construction, we replace the buffer candidate with candidates from X ∪X in the
following way.
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New Block II For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
• One voter voting: (ŷt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = yt} > q > {xt, xt} > p > d > · · · ).
• One voter voting: (ŷt > {ci,j | ℓi,j = yt} > q > {xt, xt} > p > d > · · · ).
Since from above we know that an assignment must be deleted, we know that one of each
{xi, xi} remains after deletion, and so to gain one vote over q, p swaps over a remaining x-
literal candidate in a New Block II vote to then swap over q. Note that in votes outside of
Block II where p is ranked below q, p is separated from q by at least n+ 1 buffer candidates.
5. We must then pad the above construction (Blocks I-IV) so that the following hold.
• q needs one vote over each x̂ji , each ŷi, each ci, each ci,j , and p, and no votes over other
candidates.
• q can only gain a vote over any of the ŷi, ci, or ci,j candidates without wasting a swap in
Block I and Block II.
• p needs one vote over each x̂ji , each ŷi, each ci, each ci,j , and q, and no votes over other
candidates. p wastes a swap to gain a vote over q.
• Each di ∈ D needs 2n2 + n +m + m̂ + 2 votes in total over p and q, and no votes over
candidates in C − ({p, q} ∪ D). d1 can gain these 2n2 + n + m + m̂ + 2 votes without
wasting swaps.
• Each candidate in C − ({p, q} ∪ D) needs at least 2n2 + n +m + m̂ + 2 votes over the
candidates in D.
❑
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